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The Three Ages of Financial Quantification:  
A Conventionalist Approach to the  
Financiers’ Metrology 
Eve Chiapello & Christian Walter ∗ 
Abstract: »Die drei Perioden der finanztechnischen Quantifizierung: ein kon-
ventionentheoretischer Ansatz zur Analyse der finanztechnischen Metrologie«. 
This article presents a conventionalist interpretation of the financialization of 
the economy. We define three periods, each one associated with conventional 
calculation systems that may shape investment decisions. Each of these periods 
begins with the adoption by financial practitioners of a new “convention” to 
make investment decisions: the actuarial convention at the end of the 19th 
century, the mean-variance convention during the 1970s, and the market-
consistent convention since the 1990s. These conventions are rooted in finance 
theory developments and are associated with different financing circuits for 
economic activity. When a new convention arises, it does not mean the disap-
pearance of the old one, which can still be used by some practitioners for cer-
tain given matters, but it can also redefine some financial professions by frag-
menting them according to the convention followed, and it can finally also 
give rise to new professions. 
Keywords: Financialization, finance theory, quantification, quantification 
conventions. 
1.  Introduction 
There are many different ways to describe the process of the financialization of 
the economy that has now been spreading for some thirty years: the financial 
markets’ growing influence in economic and financial regulation of invest-
ments, the dematerialization of markets that has made global interoperability 
possible, the gradual decompartmentalization of banking and insurance activi-
ties, banking disintermediation, the unfettered inventiveness of financial engi-
neering, the growing importance of financial activities in developed nations’ 
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GDP, etc. This financialization process, which is redefining whole sectors of 
the economy and transforming business operation logics as well as public poli-
cies, carries with it conceptions of the world, methods of problem analysis, 
calculation techniques, and decision-making principles which were originally 
forged for a limited number of special cases, but are now tending to spread to 
all questions and human activities. Structures for reasoning, representation and 
calculation drawn from finance can apparently be applied to and redefine all 
spheres of existence (Chiapello 2015).  
This last aspect is the focus of this article, which proposes to define the in-
terplay between the quantification conventions that underpin the development 
of finance. There has been extensive research in economic sociology to ad-
vance understanding of the forms of calculation used in the financial sector, 
particularly as they are considered determinant in market construction since 
they facilitate construction of agreement on prices. Financial theory is now 
seen, according to the title of Donald MacKenzie’s book, as “an engine, not a 
camera” (2006). This stream of research considers financiers’ work from the 
angle of the models they use, and often combines a subtle intellectual history of 
financial theory with the story of how a given model came to be adopted by 
financial actors.  
Given that it is impossible to propose equally fine-grained historical re-
search in a short article, our approach will be different, and can be summed up 
as “conventionalist.” We consider that quantification systems have a history, 
and that it is possible to sketch out that history by identifying some major turn-
ing points in the conception of the phenomena we seek to model and under-
stand. We propose to explain the history of financial modelling by introducing 
three main conventions which appeared successively in the financial field. 
After presenting our approach, we describe the three conventions, and then we 
outline some features of the periods they delimit. 
2.   Approach and Definitions 
2.1  Associating Periods of History and Forms of Calculation 
Following the approach taken in several works of research, this article rests on 
the idea that a connection can be established between changes in quantification 
systems and more general changes in the economic sphere. 
Desrosières analyzes the relationships between conceptualizations of the 
State’s role in economic affairs and certain statistical tools. He presents five 
“typical historical configurations” (the engineering state that is also a state admin-
istered by engineers, the liberal state, the welfare state, the Keynesian state, and 
the neo-liberal state) that are “not meant to describe successive stages in a histori-
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cal progression, nor are they historically or logically exclusive. In concrete 
historical situations, they are often mixed together” (Desrosières 2003, 554). 
Each one of these typical configurations is associated with a group of statis-
tical practices. For example, since the very idea of the welfare state is based on 
the notion of insurance, it requires “statistical calculations of probabilities of 
the various events described by new labour statistics” (Desrosières 2003, 560), 
and the Keynesian state needs “national accounting tables and statistical series 
describing the relations among various components of supply and demand” 
(Desrosières 2003, 560). 
Our perspective is also similar in some respects to the viewpoint discussed 
by Bryer (2000), who argues that it is possible to refer to accounting practices 
to differentiate between feudal, capitalistic, and capitalist mentalities. The types 
of calculation performed by entrepreneurs in different historical settings func-
tion as an “accounting signature” for the stage of the economy. Berland and 
Chiapello (2009) also proposed referring to accounting practices as a way to 
date the various stages of capitalism in different institutional and historical 
settings. In the same vein, we propose to show the relationship between types 
of financial calculus and the stages in financialization of the economy. 
2.2  The Three Stages of Financialization 
The idea of financialization is understood here in a fairly broad sense, designat-
ing the use of financial criteria by economic actors to make their investment 
decisions. Such decisions – to invest in a business sector or purchase an asset – 
can be based on calculation of a return on investment, which is a financial 
criterion, or on other considerations (herd behavior, habit, empathy with the 
seller, etc.). From the history of financial techniques, we identify three major 
ways of seeing investment in financial terms, associated with the three major 
groups of calculative techniques. These three calculative architectures share a 
common view: The return on investment (ROI) is what matters most. 
The oldest configuration was linked to the calculation of discounted cash 
flows (DCF). This calculation method consists of forecasting the future eco-
nomic flows that will be generated by the investment, and applying a discount 
to those flows to bring them to present value. 
Financial reasoning then underwent a substantial transformation with the in-
troduction of the mean-variance criterion in the 1950s. Under this criterion, the 
first two moments of the laws of probability (mathematical expectation and 
variance), which were previously simply measured statistically to describe 
financial variables, were used directly as parameters of theoretical models. 
Mathematical expectation and variance did not make their first appearance in 
the 1950s; they changed status, reproducing for finance the “probabilistic revo-
lution” of 1930s’ econometrics (Krüger et al. 1987a, 1987b; Desrosières 1998). 
Starting from the 1950s, these two quantities concerned not only typical values 
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of the financial variables observed, but also the theoretical law of unobservable 
variables. The mean-variance criterion would lead to models of portfolio selec-
tion and reasoning combining measures of risk (volatility) with measures of 
return (mathematical expectation of return).1 
The discount rate, which, in the first configuration, essentially related to 
what could be earned on money if it was deposited with a bank instead of being 
invested, was modified and now incorporated a risk premium related to the 
specific investment. Analysis of the behavior of stock market prices led to 
statistical estimates for probabilistic modelling (initially designed for a single 
period), assuming that successive returns are independent and stationary and 
thus that past statistics will give a good sample for modelling the future. 
Finally, in the most recent period, investments are always considered in the 
light of indications given by the markets, because the markets are constantly 
producing information on the relative values of a certain number of standard 
investments, i.e. on the price other investors would be willing to pay. The key 
point for valuing investments has thus become the active design of efficient 
markets – in accordance with neo-liberal ambitions – so that they can produce 
the required figures (in other words, market prices). The aim is no longer to 
discount expected future cash flows to obtain a present value, but quite the 
reverse: to take the present values observed on the markets, and to deduce from 
them all the expected returns on possible investments. As all values for all 
assets must be consistent with existing market prices, financial models are now 
used to value investments that have no market price in the same way as invest-
ments that do have a market price. These valuations are said to be “market-
consistent.” They are actually “model-based valuations,” whose basic tool is 
risk-neutral mathematics (see below).  
We thus argue that three major conventions of financial quantification have 
arisen in a superimposed succession, progressively overlapping: the “discount-
ing convention” (whose base form is traditional actuarial discounting, the key 
object of which is the actuarial rate), the “mean-variance convention” (based on 
the probabilistic revolution, initially in the form of the mean-variance criterion, 
the key object of which is the optimization technique), and finally the “market-
consistent convention” (whose mathematical expression evolved from the first 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) in Fama’s definition of the 1960s to the no-
arbitrage assumption in the 1980s). The arrival of a new “quantification conven-
tion” heralds the start of a new period, a new stage of financialization, although 
the old convention is not totally replaced: the new convention adds to the previ-
                                                             
1  This mean-variance criterion, coupled with the second law of errors (Laplace-Gauss) and 
Sharpe’s common cause of market fluctuations were the drivers behind the rebirth of 
Quetelet’s average man in the asset management industry (Walter 1996, 2002). The bench-
mark issues (see below) are closely related to Quetelet’s view of the average man, here re-
placed by the average portfolio (Walter 2005a). 
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ous forms and merges with them to form hybrids. The story of quantification in 
finance can thus be told as a gradual complexification of models, as new con-
ventions spring up to enhance and displace previous quantification systems. 
This simplification of history offers two advantages. Like any ideal-type 
construction, it proposes analytical tools to understand specific situations (the 
history of a profession, a market, a firm, etc.) by reference to the three conven-
tions identified. It also proposes an overall interpretation of the general devel-
opment through identification of phases. 
This means that these three major conventions, being constructed to help us 
outline a history, are informed mainly by finance’s mainstream or dominant 
ideas. By dominant, we mean ideas that have been adopted by so many actors 
that they have completely changed financial practices, professions, and regula-
tions. We do not claim that the three conventions take into account all the de-
bates on financial theory or all actual practices in the financial sector, but they 
do concern the most popular ideas and practices. In each period of time, the 
conventions were challenged and discussed. But when conventionalist re-
searchers talk about “conventions,” they often mean conventions that provide a 
good understanding of the collective operation of a particular sector (or sub-
sector) of activity (Eymard-Duvernay 1989; Storper and Salais 1997). We now 
look more closely at what we mean by financial quantification conventions.  
2.3  Financial Quantification Conventions 
The financial valuation of an “object” (an investment such as equity, a debt 
such as a bond, or other objects) involves a large number of operations and 
several choices. Using the DCF method, for instance, requires selection of a 
time horizon, sequencing periods and the year of terminal value (which often 
accounts for 70% of the present value), definition of the number of periods to 
take into consideration and projections of the economic and financial variables 
associated with each period, and with each economic scenario to produce an 
estimate of future cash flows, selection of a discount rate, by maturity or oth-
erwise, estimation of the price of the risk associated with the object (for exam-
ple market risk, credit risk, default risk, etc.). An extremely large number of 
choices must be made. These choices are not what we refer to here in the con-
cept of the “quantification convention.” A quantification convention is more 
like a meta-convention: its name covers a configuration or a coherent set of 
operations both cognitive and normative, including selection of the items to 
take into account, relevant judgement criteria, choices of mathematical sche-
mas, etc. Every quantification convention has an epistemic, a pragmatic and a 
political dimension (Chiapello and Gilbert forthcoming). 
Every financial quantification convention is first built on a set of assump-
tions regarding what makes the value of an investment, an asset or a good. 
These assumptions are used to assess the benefit and determine the decision of 
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whether or not to invest (buy or sell the asset), or simply to manage the finan-
cial risk prudently by setting aside a provision to cover its value. Since things 
are always seen in terms of return on investment, financial valuation seeks to 
grasp a future which, by definition, is uncertain because it has not yet hap-
pened. It therefore requires assumptions concerning what “shape” of uncer-
tainty the future will take, which is in practice an assumption regarding the 
distribution of financial and economic variables. Also required is a selection of 
relevant predictive factors drawn from today’s world that can be used to con-
struct a decision, i.e. selection of what is true. Finally, it is associated with 
specific forms, calculations and mathematical models which somewhat opera-
tionalize these choices into a calculable form that, according to Walter (2005b), 
could be called the “formal cause” of value, by reference to Aristotle’s causali-
ty model,2 as opposed to economic and financial information that are taken to 
represent the “raw material” of value, its “material cause.” All these factors 
relate to the epistemic dimension of the quantification convention, as it produc-
es knowledge about things by looking at them from a financial investor’s 
standpoint, and seeks to state certain truths about them. 
Every quantification convention also contains a pragmatic dimension: it 
makes certain actions possible, especially trade and arbitrage, as demonstrated 
by many studies on the economics of convention (Eymard-Duvernay 2006a, 
2006b) and the sociology of market devices (Callon et al. 2007). Each conven-
tion enables actors – not necessarily the same actors for each convention, addi-
tionally conferring a political dimension. Through coordinated or uncoordinat-
ed action by these professionals, value can emerge. In this respect, the pragmatic 
dimension of the convention can be analyzed as the “efficient cause” of value. 
The arrival of a new convention enables the growth of certain practices, reconfig-
urations of some professions, and splits in others. As a result each conventional 
period is associated with its own breakaway changes in the form of new practic-
es, changes in professions, and shifts in the power struggles between actors, or 
what MacKenzie and Spears (2014) would name an “evaluation culture.” 
The concept of the convention also suggests that several conventions are 
possible. To begin with, the financial conventions studied here only equip a 
specific way of valuing things from a financial investor’s point of view. The 
financial investor sees everything as a capital good or asset, in other words 
something that will bring him a return. The value of the thing is thus bound up 
with its expected returns. Of course, this is a very specific way of assigning 
                                                             
2  Aristotle identifies four types of cause: the material cause (the material that forms a thing: 
where does a thing come from and what is it made of?), the formal cause (the essence of 
the thing: what is its form or the model it is imitating?), the efficient cause or cause of 
change (whatever produces, destroys or modifies the thing), and the final cause (whatever 
the thing is “for”). Conceptually, the formal cause is expressed in the logos (definition) and 
in this sense, the mathematical form of the quantification refers to the idea of valuation, 
termed the “financial logos” (Walter 2011). 
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value to things, and it can conflict with other values: affective values, artistic 
values, etc. We suggest furthermore that there are several ways of looking at 
things as an investor, several forms of financial valuation itself. This means 
there are potential debates over values not only between financial valuation and 
non-financial valuation, but also involving different financial valuations, most-
ly promoted by different actors. Divergences on the question of financial value 
thus also reflect ethical divergences, because the instruments used for valuation 
are not axiologically neutral. 
2.4  Financial Quantification Conventions and Capitalism 
The financial investors’ view is a capitalistic view in the narrowest sense of the 
term. If we consider like Marx (1867) that capitalism follows an M-C-M 
(Money-Commodity-Money) cycle and money is only invested in business in 
order to make more money, then financial quantification conventions underlie 
the capitalistic judgement that things are there to increase their owner’s wealth. 
But these conventions also tell us about the way we decide, at different points 
of capitalism, to contribute funds to an activity, in other words to finance it. 
One of our hypotheses, then, is that every conventional era is associated with 
specific forms of financing for economic activity. These points will be devel-
oped further, after a more thorough presentation of the three conventions. 
3.  The Three Ages of Financial Quantification  
It is possible to consider three periods in turn, showing how the expected return 
on investment and the related uncertainties are perceived. In particular, we first 
suggest that the discount rate invented by the first convention was transformed by 
the arrival of the following conventions. We now look more closely at this point. 
3.1  The Transformations of Discounting 
With the first financial quantification convention, the “actuarial discounting 
convention,” present value is determined through a simple calculation: known 
cash flows were discounted to present value using a constant interest rate. Both 
the numerators (cash flows) and the discount factor (the inverse of the discount 
rate) are deterministic, in other words it is considered that there is no uncertain-
ty affecting future cash flows or the discount rate. The discount rate used intro-
duces into financial valuation a powerful simplification that is not obvious in 
itself: the same rate is used for all maturities of cash flows, such that the remu-
neration on money is considered identical for every maturity, whether one day 
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or one year. In other words, the yield curve is flat.3 This indicates that we have 
to be very careful when using this deterministic model. And finally, while a 
certain idea of risk is empirically taken into account by the choice of a higher 
or lower discount rate, that risk is not based on statistical calculation. These 
factors and others illustrate the numerous difficulties attached to this very sim-
ple deterministic model of valuation. 
These are points that change with the second convention of financial quantifi-
cation. In the “mean-variance convention,” the risk is defined by the variance (or 
its square root, the standard deviation).4 As a result of this convention, the level 
of risk premium is determined using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
devised by Sharpe (1964). This model gives the risk premium level (using the 
linear relationship of the beta coefficient). In this quantification convention, the 
discount factor becomes variable, as it depends on the beta coefficient, but is 
not random.5 This second convention introduces a new and extremely im-
portant idea: the relevant discount rate for calculating a present value is related 
to the rate of return on a specific portfolio known as the “MV-optimal tangent” 
portfolio; this portfolio has been considered equivalent to the “market” since the 
seminal paper by Sharpe, and this “market” needs a proxy representation in order 
to apply this theoretical research to make practical real-life decisions. Serving as 
proxies is precisely the function of market indexes (such as the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average indexes). Apart from the technicity of this change, the new devel-
opment is that financial valuation is now associated with market equilibrium. In 
the second quantification convention, valuation of any item requires a mean-
variance (MV)-optimal tangent portfolio, which in practice means actors must 
keep up with an index. And conversely, any MV-optimal tangent portfolio (or 
market index) becomes a possible instrument for asset valuation. 
The third financial quantification convention, the “market-consistent con-
vention,” extends this idea. The discount factor, which in the second conven-
tion only varied with the investments studied (i.e. the risk specific to each one, 
measured by the beta), has now become random. “Stochastic discounting” 
replaces traditional discounting, whether the rate used is given (with the first 
convention) or results from an equilibrium model such as the CAPM (in the 
second convention). The stochastic discount factor is termed the “deflator,” just 
as a traditional operation deflates nominal values to real values.  
                                                             
3  The yield curve shows the relationship between the interest rate and the time to maturity. 
4  We do not address the debates on the morphology of uncertainty here, but it should be 
remembered that the two views in competition are continuity (Brownian representation) 
and discontinuity (other representations). In the case of continuity, the risk is reduced to 
the variance. In other cases, it is necessary to complement variance with the other moments 
of the distributions if they exist, which is not always the case. 
5  A random variable is a variable whose values depend on “events” or “possible states of the 
world,” for example the face on which a die lands depends on the event “face that lands 
after the throw.” 
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Table 1: The Three Ages of the Discount Factor 
Convention Characteristic of the Discount Factor 
1 constant 
2 variable but non-random 
3 stochastic 
 
The third financial quantification convention completely reshapes financial 
theory, with its cornerstone concept of “absence of arbitrage opportunity” (see 
below) in an arbitrage-free market. With this extremely strong concept, valua-
tions of investments become “market-consistent” and pave the way for extend-
ed use of “fair market value” (FMV) as defined by international accounting 
standards. 
3.2  The Third Convention  
The intellectual cornerstone of the dominant contemporary financial approach-
es which we term the third quantification convention is the “absence of arbi-
trage opportunity” (AOA) principle in a complete market. Based on the pio-
neering mathematical results of Harrison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and 
Pliska (1981) under the AOA assumption,6 mathematical finance has come to 
consider it possible to extract expected returns on investments from market 
prices. In these conditions, market prices are considered the perfect measure of 
discounted expected cash flows and can be used to “reveal” an underlying risk-
neutral probability measure, unique all tradable securities, uncertainty being 
governed by what Mandelbrot termed “mild” randomness (i.e. fully describable 
by price volatility alone).7 
To go from market prices to expected returns, assumptions must be made 
about the rate of return. In this approach, the risk-free rate of return is used as 
the expected rate of return for investors. Changing the discount rate is equiva-
lent to changing the numeraire of the asset (a little like an exchange rate can be 
used to express a value in a different currency). But this change also means that 
real-world probabilities are replaced by a new probability termed the “risk-
neutral probability.”8 For calculative purposes the “new finance” has imagined 
                                                             
6  Followed by Delbaen and Schachermayer’s fundamental theorem of asset pricing (1994). 
7  This is typically the case of the Brownian representation embedded in the main financial 
models of mainstream mathematical finance, reflecting the persistent central role of 
Brownian motion in finance across the 20th century. Mild randomness is required to obtain 
a unique risk-neutral measure under the no-arbitrage condition. In the presence of jumps 
(discontinuous or “wild” randomness) a single risk-neutral measure is difficult to derive be-
cause the market becomes incomplete, and the further we move from the Brownian-based 
representation of risk, the weaker the AOA framework becomes. Ultimately, in a purely dis-
continuous non-Brownian uncertainty framework, the AOA framework fails. 
8  As MacKenzie and Spears (2014, 400) explain: “Those probabilities are simultaneously less 
real and more real than actual probabilities: less real, in that they do not correspond to the 
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a new world, the risk-neutral world, in which all invested assets are assumed to 
provide the same expected rate of return, namely the risk-free rate, regardless of 
the risk of each specific asset. This purely mathematical transformation certainly 
has major financial virtues. Notably, it neutralizes a form of variability in the 
discount rate, which now becomes the same for all assets, risky or otherwise, a 
situation that was impossible under the first and second conventions.  
This no-arbitrage theory has played a central role in finance. It is amazing 
how much can be deduced from this one simple financial assumption. Practi-
tioners in various sectors of finance have subscribed to this assumption to be 
able to use this new “risk-neutral” technology, which has paved the way for the 
total financialization of the global economy. The powerful elegance of the “no 
arbitrage-mild randomness” representation for market-consistent valuation is a 
major development which has profoundly transformed financial practices over 
the last thirty years. 
One of the counterintuitive consequences of this new framework is the dis-
appearance of risk for management purposes. The mathematicians of finance, 
basing their work on assumptions of an idealized market with a mild random-
ness representation of uncertainty, have shown that for any fixed amount at a 
given maturity (payment of an insurance claim, a guaranteed amount, etc.), it is 
possible to entirely tame risk, whatever the degree to which the risk on the 
relevant phenomenon (financial market, real economy, demographics, climate 
change, etc.) materializes, because of the type of randomness chosen. Practical 
application of these ideas to build financial models – which will then be used to 
value assets and make decisions – requires construction of what is termed a 
“replicating portfolio.” 
The replicating portfolio is a portfolio which shares the same properties as 
the asset it replicates (e.g. series of cash flows or terminal value). The replica-
tion technique can be used to hedge or value any type of asset, especially de-
rivatives.9 This breakthrough in mathematical financial techniques paved the 
way for an invasion of the “real” economy by derivatives. The pillar of this 
technique needs “market-consistent” valuation, whose visible mathematical 
trace is the risk-neutral probability. 
                                                                                                                                
actual probabilities of events; more real in the sense that (at least in finance) those actual 
probabilities cannot be determined, while martingale or risk-neutral probabilities can be 
calculated from empirical data, today’s market prices.” 
9  The replicating portfolio technique was already fundamental to the Black-Scholes-Merton 
model, which facilitated the rise of the options market (MacKenzie and Millo 1973), and as 
noted by several authors, the risk-neutral approach was in fact implicit in the Black-Scholes 
model (1973), but not yet expressed specifically as a new probability. As MacKenzie and 
Spears (2014, 401) put it: “It is the strategy of Black-Scholes modelling writ large: find a 
perfect hedge, a continuously-adjusted portfolio of more basic securities that will have the 
same payoff as the derivative, whatever happens to the price of the underlying asset or as-
sets; use that portfolio to hedge the derivative; and use the cost of the hedge as a guide to 
the price of the derivative.” 
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Let us summarize our point. While the key operational concept of the 1960s 
was the mean-variance (MV) optimal portfolio, leading to implementation of 
risk-return analysis in the asset management industry, the key operational con-
cept of the 1980s was this new idea of replication with no-arbitrage, leading to 
implementation of risk-neutral analysis in the derivatives industry. Given the 
importance of the risk-neutral property of arbitraged prices, for instance to 
calculate the present value of any asset with a market-consistent framework, 
this feature can be considered as both the cornerstone and the mark of the third 
quantification convention.  
The change in quantification convention is, as just seen, always supported 
by developments in financial theory, particularly the invention of new mathe-
matical models which make all sorts of values calculable because they are 
founded on very restrictive assumptions. The first convention is rooted in cal-
culation of DCF, which proposes a mathematical form that can make very 
different investments commensurable: all are treated as sums paid out with a 
view to receiving monetarily quantified returns in the future. The second is 
based on a reduction of the universe of investments under the two criteria of 
mean (the return) and variance (volatility as a measure of risk) which makes 
portfolio management models possible. Finally, the third convention is built on 
a new mathematical expression that has facilitated the rise of derivatives.  
These mathematical models have been introduced into management instru-
ments that govern financial decisions and help to shape professional practices. 
In each period, it is the models with the most easily-handled mathematical 
forms that are incorporated into calculation systems and accompany the trans-
formation in the professions of finance. The most reassuring branches of fi-
nance, because they are the most readily translatable into calculation machines, 
are the ones that have spread to the point of becoming the dominant forms. 
New professions have arisen while others have been changed. Practices pre-
viously considered highly risky because they involved a kind of gambling have 
seen particularly impressive expansion since the new calculation methods 
appeared to make them calculable and optimizable, and therefore controllable 
and manageable. Advances in modelling, combined with the increasingly mas-
sive collection of data and rising calculation capacities, mean that in finance, as 
elsewhere, people are able to undertake actions every day that used to be con-
sidered risky or impossible. It is very similar to what has happened in the 
transport sector, for instance: the speed and number of vehicles on the move 
has been increased on the grounds that vehicles of all types are safer than ever 
and their trajectories are easier to calculate and control. Of course, the limits of 
such a comparison are that the test of real-life application that validates finan-
cial models is not of the same nature, and the economic models generally show 
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low robustness.10 We will now see how each convention can be associated with 
practices, professions and points of time in capitalism. 
4.   Of Conventions and Men 
4.1  The Actuarial Convention and Direct Circuits for Financing 
Investments 
Doganova (2014) describes the adoption of the actuarial convention by forest 
managers in the late 19th century. This type of mathematical calculation, alt-
hough it has long been expressed mathematically, was only used in the eco-
nomic world for specific, well-defined objects: the estimation of financial 
annuities that could be paid out and calculations by certain life insurers (even 
though many were still operating on speculative models) (Bühlmann and 
Lengwiler forthcoming). Actuarial calculation was not used for other types of 
investments, in which an amount was also paid out, but to plant trees or acquire 
shares in a company rather than to buy an annuity. Its extension to other invest-
ment objects through the use of analogy was a key moment, and can be analyzed 
as a point in the financialization of capitalism that was also a moment of rational-
ization of the investment decision through more sophisticated calculation: not 
content with simply ensuring that the investor would regain his initial outlay with 
a surplus, calculation of DCF began to take into consideration the fact that the 
money could be invested elsewhere and generate different amounts at different 
maturities. Doganova (2014) explains that the actuarial view of the forest was 
constantly comparing the money that could be made from cutting down the trees 
today and then deposited in in an interest-bearing account, with the money re-
maining “invested” in the forest for conversion into cash at a later date. DCF 
calculations facilitate a comparison that appears rational because it can calcu-
late different investments and thus opens up the way to arbitrage. 
As far as professional practices are concerned, DCF allows comparison be-
tween pairs of investment opportunities and this makes it useful to investors who 
choose their investments one at a time. The decision to provide finance is made 
by looking at an opportunity’s potential. Today, according to the finance text-
books and in professional practice, ad hoc analysis of investments still involves 
estimating the monetary flows (cash inflows and outflows) associated with an 
investment, and then subjecting them to actuarial calculation to assess how 
attractive a prospect they are. The fund managers in private equity funds (in-
                                                             
10  Financial calculation software does not appear to be subject to the same requirements as 
other technical innovations before they are put on the market. For example, the assump-
tions of continuity used in the Brownian representation of risk were not tested, even 
though they were dangerous (Mandelbrot 1963). 
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vestment funds, venture capital funds,11 real estate management companies, 
etc.) follow this reasoning: they establish scenarios and construct business 
plans when studying potential acquisitions. The managers of start-up companies 
do the same, trying to raise funds by presenting the same type of calculative 
argument to investors. Bankers making traditional loans also look at the same 
factors: Will the investment to be funded be profitable enough to repay the loan? 
Finally, in large organizations, firms, and States, Net Present Value calculations 
have also become a required step in all investment projects. The gradual spread of 
these practices to business managers (Pezet 1997) and top civil servants in charge 
of major public investments (Miller 1991) can be dated back to the 1960s. 
What all these investment practices have in common is a strong connection 
between the financial circuit and what is sometimes called the real economy: 
the investor is aware that he is investing money in an activity and a business, 
and that the money invested soon loses its form as “money” even though the 
actuarial calculation tends to disregard this and focus solely on monetary flows. 
The actuarial convention of financial quantification in fact translates invest-
ment requirements into financial language and oils the economy’s financing 
channels. These channels involve direct investment by individuals, firms, and 
States putting their savings or their surplus funds into projects directly or via 
banking intermediation (the banker collects deposits and makes loans for con-
crete projects). The provider of funds is aware that the investment he is making 
has low liquidity and will be difficult to withdraw from. As he bears the risk, 
he needs to conduct ad hoc analyses for every investment made. 
During the first period, which we associate with the first convention, the fi-
nancial markets (which represent a different financing channel from the self-
financing and credit-financing channels) were of course in existence, and were 
even very large in certain countries at certain times (Obstfeld and Taylor 2002). 
But the patterns of reasoning used by their practitioners, who traded on stock 
exchanges and managed securities portfolios, were embedded in the first con-
vention. Their professional approach can be found for example in the famous 
textbook “The Theory of Investment Value” (Williams 1938), that was used to 
train generations of financial analysts. This relates to the first convention, as 
the idea is to evaluate the discounted cash flows of a given security, and fore-
cast the movements in an individual stock price, or predict overall stock market 
movements. This is still the basis of “fundamental analysis” which consists in 
forming a projection of future cash flows and “fundamental prediction” which 
consists in forming scenarios of future events. 
These stock exchange professionals were the central actors of the second pe-
riod, as the second convention not only produced a revolution in their standard 
                                                             
11  France has venture capital funds called “FCPR” (Fonds commun de placement à risques), 
which are investment vehicles designed for investments in private equity. 
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practices, but was also instrumental in the rise of their professions, as we shall 
now see. 
4.2  The Mean-Variance Convention and Disintermediated 
Financing 
The new convention proposed a portfolio-based reasoning. In fact, Markowitz 
(1952, 1959) rigorously justified the concept of diversification, and demon-
strated that any investor should consider not only the individual assets, search-
ing for any theoretical under-evaluation, but the portfolio as a whole, with its 
total risk and total return, i.e. the overall trade-off between risk and return. The 
second convention gave birth to what is called the “quantitative approach to 
investment management” which is based upon statistical-probabilistic princi-
ples, and uses rational analysis to construct portfolios.  
This convention accompanied the rise of institutional investors (particularly 
pension funds) in corporate financing. This rise is usually associated with the 
financialization process that began in the 1970s and went hand-in-hand with 
banking disintermediation. Funds came to be raised less through bank debt and 
more by issuance of securities (shares and bonds) on the financial markets. 
This financing channel, which had then gained importance, is generally marked 
by the existence of financial intermediaries who do not invest directly in pro-
jects, but buy liquid securities on a stock market. Except at the time of issu-
ance, the money invested does not actually go to the firms being financed. 
Most monetary exchanges take place between professional financial actors, and 
the financial markets are mainly resale markets, secondary markets, not to say 
speculative markets.12 
With this second period, trade in securities directly involving individuals 
which were still important in the first period became a very small part of the 
market: individuals were now putting their savings into funds that took charge 
of investing them for profit on their behalf. As for the companies that used the 
markets for financing, they had to monitor the secondary market for their secu-
rities if they wanted to raise further funds or avoid changing owner. Ultimately, 
the transformation of financing modes over this period was accompanied by a 
drastic change in governance in the name of shareholder value, as has been so 
                                                             
12  In fact, Kaldor’s definition is fully aligned with these practices: “Speculation […], may be 
defined as the purchase (or sale) of goods with a view to re-sale (re-purchase) at a later 
date, where the motive behind such action is the expectation of a change in the relevant 
prices relatively to the ruling price and not a gain accruing through their use, or any kind of 
transformation effected in them or their transfer between different markets. Thus, while 
merchants and other dealers do make purchases and sales which might be termed ‘specula-
tive,’ their ordinary transactions do not fall within this category” (Kaldor 1939, 1). 
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extensively described in the literature (Aglietta and Rébérioux 2005; Fligstein 
1990, 2001). 
Portfolio management models paved the way for a new professional figure 
and new professional practices, although their integration into the world of 
portfolio managers had its difficulties. After several years of confinement in-
side the academic world, portfolio theory began to enter the professional field 
at the beginning of the seventies, thanks to the simplification of the necessary 
calculations implemented by Sharpe in 1963. The mathematical complexity of 
the calculations was reduced so that it became possible to implement the simple 
linear formula of Sharpe’s CAPM model. But even then, as noted by many 
professional investment managers, among them Andrew Rudd, “unfortunately, 
the computational requirements were too burdensome for the approach to be 
implemented on a large scale until the mid-70s” (Rudd 1989, 20). 
Nevertheless, even after all these operational problems had been overcome, 
some asset managers decided to stick to practices we associate with the first 
convention, emphasizing active management, stock picking, and buy-and-hold 
practices, as opposed to passive or index-linked management, the watchword 
being: “don’t tell me about indexation” (Walter 1996, 2002). The radically new 
and relatively provocative intellectual construction of the new quantitative way 
of managing funds ran counter to the traditional practices of professional asset 
managers, financial experts and technical analysts, who considered it possible 
to outperform or “beat the market” through detection of underpriced securities 
by traditional first-convention-based methods. 
Table 2 shows how the asset management industry has evolved. Chronolog-
ically, the history of this industry began with stock selection practices that did 
not involve any probabilistic risk modelling: this is the “traditional” or “quali-
tative” conception of management, as opposed to use of probabilistic models. It 
was a “bottom-up” approach, where what counts is close examination of each 
target investment rather than an overall by-sector or by-geographical area ap-
proach, which is called “top-down.” Then, from the 1960s, under the influence 
of Markowitz and Sharpe, the “quantitative” approach of asset management 
emerged. As previously remarked, a small minority of actors in the portfolio 
management industry refused to adopt these quantitative practices using index-
linked funds and maintained a “counter-culture” of asset management called 
“alternative asset management,” but this minority still lived in a world pro-
duced by the second convention (through the calculation software and financial 
bases they used, or through the applicable professional standards). 
This professional revolution supported by the second convention was insep-
arable from the speedy growth in volumes traded on the markets. In countries 
that opted for a funded pension system, the apparent security of new, financial 
theory-based professional models led public policies to encourage the emer-
gence of new financial actors. In the US, for instance, the 1974 Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) law triggered a general transfer of 
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pension fund management from their traditional managers (corporate manage-
ment and unions) to finance professionals (Montagne 2006, 2012). 
Table 2:  The Asset Management Industry and Financial Quantification 
Conventions 
Financial Quantification 
Convention 
“Bottom-Up” Investment 
Process 
“Top-Down” Investment 
Process 
First convention: actuarial, 
with no risk modelling 
“Qualitative” approach to 
portfolio management 
 
Dominant approach in the 
first period 
Traditional management, 
seeking out underpriced 
securities using DCF and 
criteria such as “fundamental 
analysis” with no consideration 
of risk parameters 
 
Second convention:  
probabilistic risk modelling. 
“Quantitative” approach to 
portfolio management 
 
 
Minority approach (“alterna-
tive” management methods) 
Active management by selec-
tion of securities, prioritizing 
separate investment decisions 
for each security to the detri-
ment of “macro” decisions.  
Supporters of these practices 
are nonetheless part of a social 
world produced by the second 
convention 
 
Dominant approach in the 
second period (“orthodox” 
management methods) 
Index-linked management, 
passive or semi-active man-
agement, prioritizing major 
“macro” level decisions (by 
sector or country). 
“Performance numbers” 
CAPM-based and “benchmark” 
paradigm 
Still the dominant situation 
today  
 
What we call the mean-variance convention thus accompanied the exponential 
growth in the securities market financing channels, and this went hand-in-hand 
with the rise of financial actors who were now much more disconnected from 
the real economy than in the first convention. The new decision-makers pre-
ferred highly liquid listed securities, and no longer needed to know what real 
investments were being made by firms. They were mainly interested in move-
ments in stock prices, in other words the prices other professionals are willing 
to pay to buy the securities they hold, and the trends on this secondary market. 
They were judged and controlled mainly by reference to the various market 
indexes that operationalize the “market.” They lived in a world of purely finan-
cial returns. Since the investments they made were highly liquid, capital turno-
ver was very fast and took on the form of “money” several times a day. Money 
seemed to produce returns without transiting through investments in real pro-
jects. This is the illusion of liquidity produced by the financial markets that 
Keynes had already denounced: while the securities are liquid and could be 
traded, the investments made by the firm using the money collected are not. 
The second convention thus accompanied what is usually called financial 
disintermediation, which is the decline in bank borrowing-based financing of 
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the economy. The intermediation that began to disappear was balance sheet 
intermediation, in the sense that a financial actor carries in its balance sheet the 
risk of the financial transformation between the funds collected in the form of 
deposits, and the loans it has made. The new intermediaries operated different-
ly, only investing money belonging to others: the bearers of the risks associated 
with the investments selected by them were now investors who put their sav-
ings into funds which these intermediaries merely managed. The banking world 
itself changed: banks found it beneficial not to carry the risks in their balance 
sheet13 and to receive returns not on the differences between the cost of resources 
and the interest rates of the loans made, but on the sale of services to issuers and 
the management fees charged for managing portfolios for third parties. 
4.3  The Market-Consistent Convention and the Derivatives 
Explosion 
Finally, the third convention is closely connected to the rise of derivatives, 
which themselves have facilitated all kinds of financial innovations by combina-
tion into what are known as structured products. These products account for a 
substantial portion of financial trade today and have largely contributed to a 
redefinition of financial actors’ boundaries, blurring the lines between the tradi-
tional bank handing out loans and the asset management industry, and also the 
lines between these banking and financial activities, and insurance activities.  
Financialization of the economy is often associated with the “3D” evolution 
(decompartmentalization, deregulation, and disintermediation). With the third 
convention, it is possible to take the decompartmentalization process to un-
precedented levels, which is not unproblematic for the regulators. From the 
outset financial regulation has followed the silo approach: banking organiza-
tions are governed by different standards from insurance organizations, which 
are in turn governed by different standards from those applicable to investment 
funds and pension funds (Scialom and Tadjeddine 2015). 
One very interesting case is the expansion of credit derivatives. The name 
credit derivative covers various instruments and techniques designed to sepa-
rate and then transfer the “credit risk” (the risk of an event of default by a bor-
rower), transferring it to an entity other than the debtholder. Most credit deriva-
tives are credit default swaps (CDS). CDSs developed very quickly in 
conjunction with collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), which are bonds 
                                                             
13  Securitization of debts (bonds rather than bank debts) was recognized in the 1980s as the 
way to reduce banking risks in a context of expensive credit (Bastidon Gilles et al. 2010). 
This is its oldest form. The type of securitization involved in the subprime crisis was different 
(because subprime securities were no longer issued by the final borrower, for instance a 
household taking on a mortgage, but by special entities created to pool credits) but related 
to the same aim to free the banks of the weight of the risks, which naturally tends to make 
close examination of the projects submitted less important for the banks. 
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issued against a mixed pool of credits. In this technique, credits are pooled into 
a financial vehicle (called a Special Purpose Entity, or a Securitization vehicle) 
used to securitize the loans by issuing obligations. The major role played by 
CDSs and CDOs in the financial crisis of 2008 is well known and these prac-
tices could only develop because of the integration of the third convention 
modelling into new software by investment banks and credit rating agencies 
(MacKenzie 2011).14 The combination of CDSs and CDOs made a new strate-
gy possible: building portfolios of debt securities, then packaging and selling 
off tranches based on default probabilities. Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner 
(2009) studied the rise of this brand new concept of credit derivatives. They 
explain that with the success of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) 
enhanced by the Black and Scholes Formula (MacKenzie and Millo 2003), 
financial engineers  
began to explore the potential of the new technology. Identifying the price 
variation of primary financial assets with ‘risk,’ they proposed to create a dif-
ferent kind of ‘derivatives’ [...]. Credit derivatives result from an extension of 
this logic, in which the underlying asset is replaced by the amount of the credit 
risk borne by a debt. (MacKenzie and Millo 2003, 549-50).  
This was a complete innovation, as it meant there was no straightforward link 
to an underlying asset, whereas in the options valuation formula proposed by 
Black and Scholes the fact that the underlying stocks are traded on the market 
is crucial.  
First CDSs, then CDOs were created in the mid-1990s by J. P. Morgan. The 
ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association) has been fighting ever 
since to legitimize and obtain recognition of these practices, achieving the 
notable success of the decision that CDSs were not insurance contracts but 
financial products (Huault and Rainelli-Le Montagner, 2009, 560; Morgan, 
2008). These credit derivatives are the symbol of hybridized financial practic-
es: they are clearly providing insurance, which is traditionally the business of 
insurers. This insurance concerns the credit risk, which is a risk professionally 
managed traditionally by banks as it represents their core competence. But 
these products are sold neither by traditional banks nor insurers: new actors on 
the financial markets have arrived to compete with the more longstanding 
actors – who have responded by adopting the new practices themselves. As a 
result the banks actively participate in the securitization processes of the credits 
they give, and insurers too are starting to securitize the risks they insure, to 
fight competition from new market entrants (Bühlmann and Lengwiler forth-
coming). And when the national laws allow it, the same big financial groups 
carry out various operations with their subsidiaries. 
                                                             
14  MacKenzie and Spears (2014) mention for example the introduction of CreditMetrics by J. P. 
Morgan in 1997, to evaluate credit risk, then the adoption of CDO Evaluator by Standard & 
Poor in November 2001.  
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Thanks to the techniques of derivatives, each component of the risk can now 
be covered by the creation of ad hoc instruments that can be traded on a mar-
ket; this proliferation of financial instruments and derivatives markets triggered 
extensive change in the international capital markets, which have become a 
gigantic “risks fair.” In parallel, the banks and insurance companies, whose job 
used to be to bear long-term risks in their balance sheets, have learned to pass 
those risks on by securitizing them. By the grace of the models of the third 
financial quantification convention, all assets (credits) and all liabilities (insur-
ance commitments) can now be securitized. This is precisely the property of 
market-consistent valuation models to be able to price such brand new assets.  
The political clout of the third convention is so extensive today that its mod-
els are promoted by banking and insurance regulators (with the Basel III 
framework for banks and the Solvency II framework for insurance). Ultimately 
it looks as though the regulators, being unable to stem the tide, took on the idea 
initially advocated by the ISDA that good risk management could be carried 
out by well-informed financial actors practicing daily valuation of their risk 
exposure based on market prices. This is what the third convention’s mathe-
matical instruments propose. 
And so these instruments have also overseen a general disqualification of 
traditional risk assessment methods, which used to be based on ad hoc anal-
yses. Since bankers can rapidly pass on the risks they acquire through lending, 
they no longer need to know their clients. All they need is a statistical approach 
to the default risk by category of borrowers (Baud and Chiapello 2015). Insur-
ers, meanwhile, are gradually abandoning the traditional risk estimation meth-
ods that until now constituted their expertise.15 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed a conventionalist interpretation of the financial-
ization of the economy. To do so we have identified three periods, each one 
associated with conventional calculation systems that inform an investment 
decision. Each of these periods begins with the adoption of a new convention in 
the field of financial decision-making. 
The significant factor in the actuarial period, which started with the 20th 
century, was the spread of DCF calculations. This marked a moment of ration-
alization of investment decisions, with the possibility of choosing between 
different projects on a solely financial basis. This convention constructed a 
commensurability between essentially disparate investments, all translated into 
                                                             
15  These methods largely relate to the first quantification convention (ad-hoc estimation of 
the probabilities of damage and the cost of that damage, adjusted to present value by actu-
arial techniques). 
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cash flow terms. This period, with the breakdown of the 1929 crisis and the 
ensuing substantial reduction in financial market activity until the end of the 
1960s, saw broad dissemination of the associated convention beyond the re-
stricted world of finance. DCF became the rational method of investment selec-
tion in a Fordist period that gave priority to industrial investment and employ-
ment over ROI. This period is not usually considered as a period of 
financialization because the financial markets had only a minor role, yet it 
should be considered essential in the spread of financial calculation: it actually 
resulted in the technique of discounting being taken for granted as the accepted 
method for intertemporal calculations. The key word of this first period is 
“discounting”: the key intellectual schema is that of pulling the future closer to 
the present. As seen earlier, the second and third conventions did not challenge 
the principle of discounting, but they did change the definition of the rate used, 
and then the mathematical structure of the calculation. 
The second period was based on the portfolio model and the efficient market 
hypothesis, which were developed in the 1950s and 1960s. It was associated 
with asset managers’ adoption in the 1970s of “quantitative” or “modern” 
methods from modern portfolio theory; these methods revolutionized the busi-
ness sector in the 1980s, but also brought it legitimacy. Without that revolution, 
the lawmakers would probably have been less favorable to the banking disin-
termediation that was set in motion in the 1970s. The key word for this second 
period is “diversification”; the key intellectual schema (added to the first) is the 
portfolio concept. 
These two periods bring out two professional histories that are initially math-
ematically heterogeneous: the history of financial valuation and the history of 
fund management. These two histories first drew closer in the second period 
through the use of a discount rate derived from portfolio models in an efficient 
market in equilibrium, and then became mathematically homogeneous in the 
third period through the use of the replicated portfolio concept in an arbitraged 
market, whose rate of return became the norm for financial valuation. 
The third (and recent) period, which began in the 1980s, is associated with a 
total overhaul of the efficient market hypothesis thanks to the invention of 
mathematical models able to produce values needed to market derivatives, 
using portfolios whose cash flows replicate the cash flow values of derivatives 
(hence the term “replicated portfolio”). In particular, these models have made it 
possible to construct derivatives from underlying assets that are not themselves 
traded on the markets, creating “synthetic assets” that have underpinned risk 
securitization. These innovations have taken our economies into a new stage of 
financialization that started end of the 1990s. During the second period, bank 
and insurance firm balance sheets were modified to incorporate much larger 
securities portfolios, making these two types of organization major actors in the 
financial markets; the third period is characterized by large-scale redefinition of 
the traditional businesses of banks (credit) and insurance companies. The key 
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word for this third period is “arbitrage.” The key intellectual schema (added to 
the first two) is the replication concept. 
In the first period, any “object” could be discounted to extract a present val-
ue. In the second period, this discounting was applied to a portfolio of securi-
ties. In the third period, that portfolio has become a possible replication of any 
item, even non-financial. 
The arrival of a new convention does not necessarily quash the previous 
convention, which can continue to be used by certain practitioners for certain 
matters (private equity funds, for example, are still working with the first con-
vention), but it can also redefined some professions by fragmenting them ac-
cording to the convention followed, as we noted for the asset management 
industry. It can finally also give rise to brand new organized professions like 
the swaps and derivatives industry (ISDA). 
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